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The idea of Basic Income has gained ground around schoolers and public authorities. Several 
experiments have been conducted over the last decades with interesting results being 
observed. At the same time Minimum Income Schemes across, the most similar type of policy 
in place, seem incapable of achieving their proposed goals. This work selects four Basic 
Income experiments and compares their results with the results of the Portuguese Minimum 
Income Scheme. It shows that the Portuguese current Scheme does not fully accomplish its 
proposed goals of reducing poverty while promoting inclusion. Moreover, it is demonstrated 
that Basic Income Experiments delivered motivating results both in terms of shrinking 
poverty and stimulating labor. This work argues that the current Portuguese Minimum Income 





A discussão à volta da implementação de um Rendimento Básico Universal tem ganho 
adeptos junto de investigadores e entidades públicas. Várias experiências foram levadas a 
cabo nas últimas décadas, produzindo resultados interessantes. Simultaneamente, as políticas 
de Rendimento Mínimo em vigor – o tipo de política que mais se assemelha a um Rendimento 
Básico Universal – têm sido incapazes de cumprir os pressupostos em que foram fundados. 
Este trabalho seleccionou quatro experiências com Rendimento Básico Universal e comparou 
os seus resultados com os resultados produzidos pelo esquema de Rendimento Mínimo 
Português. É demonstrado que o esquema Português não é capaz de cumprir os objectivos a 
que se propõs quer a nivel da redução de pobreza, quer na ajuda à inserção social e 
profissional. É ainda evidenciado que as experiências de Rendimento Básico Universal foram 
capazes de mitigar os indíces de pobreza enquanto promoviam o emprego e a inclusão. Este 
trabalho considera que o esquema de Rendimento Mínimo Português necessita de ser 
reconfigurado e que a ideia de um Rendimento Básico Universal devia ser considerada como 
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Data shows that the world has never been wealthier (World Bank, 2017) and the last decades 
presented an outstanding decrease in extreme poverty. This reduction was particularly 
remarkable in nations that enjoyed explosive growth such as those in the regions of East and 
South Asia.  However, as of 2011 around 14% of the world population was still severely poor. 
In addition, the recent financial crisis and the economic deceleration that followed caused 
some setbacks on this matter. For example, in the period between 2007 and 2014, out of the 
35 members of OECD, 21 saw an increase in the share of population below their poverty 
threshold (OECD, 2017). In line with this recent trend, we observe a rise in market inequality 
income in both developing and developed nations (ibid). The consequences of inequality and 
poverty on matters like social mobility, growth, crime, or education have been more or less 
unanimous among literature (Berg et al, 2014; Corak, 2013; Fajnzylber et al, 2002). It is 
undisputed that a society which struggles to grow, has low social mobility, increasing levels 
of crime, and in which education is not efficient is one where freedom and individual justice 
are endangered. Justice is a fundamental matter in every society. It is as John Rawls stated 
“the first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls 1971, 3). Although potentially skeptical about a 
Basic Income (Noguera et al, 2013), Rawls’ Liberal-Egalitarianism is a trend followed by 
most supporters of Basic Income (BI) and the moral substance of the idea. This idea gained 
momentum with all of the above leading to a growing discussion about the concept and its 
potential. We have seen experiences being conducted at smaller scales throughout the world 
with interesting results. The closest idea that current welfare policy uses at large scale is 
Minimum Income (MI). This policy was first developed over 50 years ago and it is now used 
in most developed regions and some under-developed nation with the goal of alleviating 
poverty and promoting employment. However, we will see that its success in doing so can be 
questioned. For this reason and given the similarities between a Minimum Income and a Basic 
Income in terms of essence and goals I believe that developing a work that allows us to revisit 
some of the most thorough BI experiments ever conducted in connection with an analysis 
about the current Portuguese MI scheme can be valuable. It will allow us not only to 
understand better the effectiveness of the Minimum Income policy in Portugal, but also to 
comprehend the potentialities of a BI in the country in a time where several cities and 
authorities around the world are developing and implementing pilots of the scheme. Given 
that the goals that were on the base of implementing Minimum Income Schemes are related 
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with the subjects of Poverty and Labor Inclusion, I will perform my analysis by covering 
these two topics and the potential effects of the two measures on both. 
A couple of limitations need to be considered. I will use the BI definition in Van Parijs (1995) 
– a universal and unconditional, no-means tested benefit which is big enough to cover a 
individual’s basic needs - but since only a limited number of BI experiments were ever 
conducted, the width of choice is reduced and some of the BI assumptions that my definition 
uses will need to be withdrawn. Also, the BI experiments selected for the purpose of this work 
were not exactly intended to answer the questions I aim to respond here. Thus at some 
moments conclusions will need to be taken carefully and data will have to be examined in an 
indirect way.  
I do not expect to provide full and straight answers, but what I intend and hope to do over this 
work is to contribute to the debate on Basic Income and help to raise questions regarding the 
















2. Literature Review 
2.1 - A Brief History of Basic Income 
 
In this first chapter I will briefly go through the history of Basic Income. My aim is to point 
out the most important contributions to the matter over the last 500 years, but also to show 
that the issues that are at the center of discussion today have been under argument since the 
first theory on BI was developed. 
To track back the first ideas on a BI we have to travel to the Renaissance. In the 16
th
 Century 
Thomas More and Johannes Ludovicius Vives, on discussing justice and equality, would draw 
the very first ideas about the subject.  It was in order to address crime and poverty that the 
concept was first developed.
1
 The authors saw BI as a potential response for such issues, and 
Vives, the “father” of BI drew the first proposal. His plan would be financed by the local 
government and be mainly targeted to the poor with the condition that the entitled person 
would be willing to work
2
. A new approach is observed in the 18
th
 century when Thomas 
Paine, brings the concept of universality to the table. Paine’s vision was that land is common 
property of all men, and that for this reason, those who own land were in debt to the rest of 
the community. Hence, a BI should be universal and funded through a so called “ground 
rent”
3
 that these owners owed to the community (King & Marangos, 2006).  
Bertrand Russell, in accordance to Paine’s vision, designed in the 20
th
 century his own plan 
on a BI. Such plan would be divided in two: a small income, secured to all whether or not 
they work, and a bigger transfer that should be awarded to those who engage in activities who 
are to be considered, useful by the community
4
.  
This universality continues in the 20
th
 century with Nobel Laureate James Meade. In his work 
on the subject, which lasted his entire career, being lastly presented in Agathotopia
5
, Meade 
                                                          
1
 More was openly against death penalty, claiming that “Instead of inflicting these horrible punishments, it 
would be far more to the point to provide everyone with some means of livelihood” Source: Adams, R & Logan, 
G (eds) 2002, Utopia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
2
 Source: Tobriner, A (ed) 1999, On the Assistance to the Poor, Reinassance Society of America, Canada. 
3
 In a pamphlet written in 1797 called Agrarian Justice, Thomas Paine describes ground rent as a tax that should 
be paid by land owners once by generation. Paine proposes a 10% tax on direct inheritances, and a higher rate 
for indirect inheritances. 
4
 Source: Russell, B 1996, “Work and Pay”, in Proposed Rods to Freedom, Project Gutenberg Etext, viewed 23 
September 2016 
5
 The word comes from the merge of the words Agathos, which means good, and Utopia. It would describe a 
place that would be good enough to live in, opposing to Thomas More’s Utopia, where the author describes a 
perfect but unreachable model of society  
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proposes a “social dividend”, which should be unconditional and equal to every citizen. 
According to the Nobel Prize winner, the dividend would be the right tool to alleviate poverty 
and to crear a more just and efficient economy. 
In the second half of the century Milton Friedman propposed the idea of a Negative Income 
Tax (NIT) as a new policy on social welfare
6
. Since I will describe some NIT experiments 
later on seems sensible to explain briefly how does a NIT work. The State defines a certain 
threshold and households whose income falls below that threshold are awarded a subsidy. The 
size of the subsidy would depend on the established tax. If for example the threshold was 
defined at 5000$ and the household or family had a total income of 4000$, then for a tax of 
20%, the subsidy would be 200$. This is the result of applying the 20% tax to the gap 
between the earned income and the border defined by the government (Moffitt, 2003). 
Friedman’s idea brought attention to the subject of BI in the US and in 1968, James Tobin, 
Joseph Pechman and Paul Samuelson were amongst a group of 1200 economists who signed a 
document calling for the Congress to introduce a system of income guarantees. The proposal 
would ultimately be rejected by the Senate but opened room for the first experiments around 
the world, and launched the discussion in Europe. 
As I stated in the introduction of this chapter, what the history of BI tells us is that today’s 
questions regarding the proposal are the ones that were raised by most authors in the past. 
From More’s concern on Labor supply effects, to Paine’s method of funding it. Russell’s 
vision on freedom or Friedman’s approach on welfare systems are all items under discussion 
today. Such subjects are the Nemesis of a BI, and henceforth the topics that I intend to discuss 
in this work. 
 
2.2 - Basic Income vs Minimum Income 
In this section I will review what the literature says about the theoretical effects of Basic 
Income and Minimum Income over the subjects under analysis in this work: Poverty and the 
Labor Market. In order to better understand the two policies and their potential consequences 
let me briefly describe their proposals and its differences. A Basic Income, as I stated before, 
is in the definition I am using here a no means-tested universal cash benefit. It is awarded to 
                                                          
6
 The Negative Income Tax (NIT) idea was first ever proposed in his book Capitalism and Freedom, but was 
constantly developed throughout Friedman’s career. The Nobel Laureate saw NIT as a solution to eliminate the 
welfare trap and develop an incentive to work for those under state assistance. Moreover the policy would also 
allow for a reduction in Bureaucracy and Administrative Costs raised by all the multiple programmes that were 
and still are today in place to assist the poor. 
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every citizen regardless of income or work situation and its amount is similar to all citizens 
(Van Parijs,1995). On the other hand a Minimum Income is a benefit awarded to those 
households who fall in the poorest deciles of society as a measure of providing a safety net 
below no one should fall. The subsidy covers a gap between the individual’s income and a 
certain amount that the State considers as a fair amount under which no citizen should live on. 
The measure is usually linked to an inclusion goal and beneficiaries are often obligated to 
either perform work or pursue some type of training.  
2.2.1 - Basic Income vs Minimum Income: Poverty – A Fair and Equal Society 
Current poverty rates are one of the main arguments of BI supporters. They believe that 
through Basic Income we are able to reduce more effectively the incidence and severity of 
poverty. By being unconditional, BI breaks the link between work and income and could 
ultimately interveen amongst those who fall in the poverty trap that current welfare creates. 
To comprehend this argument better let us compare the two schemes regarding earned and 
unearned income. Fig. 1 shows us the differences between conditional and unconditional 
benefits in the presence of a minimum wage. Given that Portugal, the nation under analysis, 
falls in this category – a conditional transfer in the presence of a minimum wage – the 
example seems relevant.  
Figure 1 - Conditional vs Unconditional Welfare System 
 
 
Source: Groot (2004) 
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On the horizontal axis  we have gross labor earnings and on the vertical axis we see net of tax 
and transfer income. The line S̅D̅  represents the unconditional benefit – Basic Income -  
summed to the minimum wage with a single tax rate equal to 𝑡 = 60%. It is important to note 
that there is a difference between the withdrawal rate and the rate applied to earnings. The 
first represents the percentage of every extra dollar earned captured by the scheme. The 
second is just the usual tax rate on earnings. The line S̅A̅H̅C̅ represents the conditional 
benefit. The point S represents the social minimum amount, meaning the value that the State 
defines as the one that no beneficiary should fall below. In the BI case we have a flat tax rate 
𝑡 = 60% while on the other, the rate is 𝑡 = 25%, taking into account the potential costs of 
each policy
7
. With a conditional system those who are unemployed get earnings equal to the 
line O̅S̅. For a withdrawal rate of 100%, like in the Portuguese case, meaning every extra euro 
earned above the level S is captured, those who are employed under the conditional system, 
stay in the line S̅A̅, the poverty trap line, until their revenue is bigger than 𝑌𝑝8. The poverty 
trap means that if a person is under the conditional assistance it does not compensate to 
perform any work that does not raise the earnings above that level. In the graph we see that 
the benefit is only a little below the amount defined as Minimum wage, 𝑀. This is usually the 
case in countries that support the two policies (Frazer&Marlier, 2016). Given that most 
people who face this poverty trap are under qualified, meaning low skilled, and are unable to 
find a job that pays a salary much higher than the ruled minimum wage, there is usually no 
escape from the trap
9
. With a BI programme, the poverty trap disappears given that as line S̅D̅ 
shows, every extra euro earned is not absorbed, although to be sustainable the flat tax rate 
considered should be raised (in this case t’=60%). Since every citizen would receive the 
benefit, the system would generate net earners and payers, depending on the amount of earned 
income. In the end of the day, given that the flat tax rate would suffer a substantial increase it 
is straightforward that most households woulde be net-payers and thus would be worse off. 
However, when we compare the two we see that if the social minimum amount is kept as the 
same level, no one would fall below this level with BI. Moreover, since the line  S̅A̅ 
                                                          
7
 It is worth mentioning however that although costs could increase with a basic income delivered to everyone 
the bureaucratic costs would be highly reduced given that the programme would be no means-tested. Moreover 
there would be no possibility of giving the benefit to someone who should not be entitled to it 
8
 It is relevant to notice that in the Portuguese case the line S̅A̅, depends on the type of household or famlily. 
Given that when calculating the minimum amount a household or family  should receive, the State takes into 
account the family’s composition, each family will have a different threshold. Hence the line S̅A̅ will vary across 
the population 
9
 In Portugal for example, the percentage of Minimum Income beneficiaries’ who have secondary or higher 
education are only 9% against 29% of the entire population (Social Security, 2016; Statistics Portugal, 2016) 
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disappears, everyone that was on the poverty trap before and decides to engage in paid work 
is awarded with a net income above the level permitted with Minimum Income.  
The transition to a BI in the terms here propposed is not Pareto efficient and would raise 
discussion over the issues of justice and reciprocity. However, it is clear that BI presents a 
better model to tackle poverty amongst the lowest deciles of society. By eliminating the 
poverty trap that current Welfare promotes, BI is able to allow all of the households who were 
under this trap to increase their net earnings through paid work and at the same time avoid for 
any of them to fall below the social minimum that was already fixed. 
 
2.2.2 - Basic Income vs Minimum Income: The Labor Market  
We have seen in the previous chapter how by eliminating the poverty trap, BI could create an 
incentive for the unemployed under assistance to perform paid work. However, given that the 
scheme would no longer be conditional or means-tested – like in the case of a Minimum 
Income - and that the amount delivered would be enough to cover the beneficiary’s basic 
needs, an impact on the labor market should be expected. Critics of the scheme often claim 
that the incentive to work would be strongly reduced, thus a decrease in the number of hours 
worked would be observed, and that this would result in a complete remodeling of the labor 
market (Anderson & Block, 1993). In this chapter I will analyze these concerns. To make the 
analysis more harmonious I will adapt the model used in Moffitt (2002). 
 The model goes as following: the individual chooses Leisure(𝐿) and Consumption (𝐶) with a 
budget constraint equal to 𝑃𝐶 = 𝑁 + 𝑊(𝑇 − 𝐿). 𝑃 being the price, 𝑁 the unearned income, 
𝑊 is the wage rate and 𝑇 is the total time available. If we consider Hours of work, 𝐻, as 
𝐻 = 𝑇 − 𝐿, then the individual will choose his utility over the function 𝑈(𝐻, 𝑌), maximized 
to 𝑁 + 𝑊𝐻 = 𝑌. Adding now a benefit 𝐵 = 𝐺 − 𝑡(𝑊𝐻 + 𝑁) we have a new budget 
constraint equal to 𝑊 (1 − 𝑡)𝐻 + 𝐺 − 𝑡𝑁 = 𝑌. G is equal to the amount given to those with 
zero income – in fig.1 this would be the equivalente to 𝑆 - and 𝑡 is the marginal tax rate. 
Minimum Income and Basic Income will differ on the size of 𝐺 and the marginal tax rate 𝑡 
used. Over the next sections I will analyze what are the different results of changing these 
variables. 
I would like to start my analysis with the implementation of a Minimum Income from scratch. 
Fig.2 shows the results of this implementation 
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Figure 2- Introduction of Minimum Income 
 
 
𝐶𝐷 represents the budget constraint 𝑊 (1 − 𝑡)𝐻 + 𝐺 − 𝑡𝑁 = 𝑌. The line 𝐶𝐷 intersects 𝐴𝐶 at 
the point defined in the model as 𝐺. 𝐴𝐸 is the constraint for an economy with no welfare 
policy in place. The arrows 1 and 2 show what the consequences of introducing the measure 
to both people earning an amount below and above the level are. If they earn an amount that 
is located below D, in the line AD, that means that they are better off by being under welfare 
assistance even if they reduce the numbers of hours worked. For people above the level 𝐷 
they would still reduce the number of hours worked eventhough they would face a reduction 
in their income. In this example the marginal tax rate is equal to the slope of 𝐶𝐷, meaning 
−𝑊(1 − 𝑡). However, it is usually the case where 𝑡 = 1. Fig. 3 shows that the results are 
similar for that case. In this figure we have an example of the transition from a regime with no 
Minimum Income Scheme in place to a regime where a Minimum Income is delivered with a 
marginal tax rate, 𝑡=1. 
Source: Moffitt (2002) 
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Figure 3 – Introduction of Minimum income – t=1 
 
 
Until the worker is able to go above the break-even point he has no incentive to enroll in labor 
activities. As I stated above, introducing a BI presents a different structure, not only because 
the benefit becomes universal but also because the amount distributed to each individual is 
substantially higher and the marginal tax rate on the transfer is zero (although as we saw the 
flat tax rate actually increases to make up for the cost). Let us understand now how a change 
in G, the value of the benefit, affects the dynamics.  
Figure 4 – Effects of Increasing G 
 
 
In the scenario described by Fig.4 we are still dealing with a marginal tax rate 𝑡 < 1. The 
consequences of increasing the amount distributed by the programme are similar  to those we 
saw with the introduction of Minimum Income. Regardless of the amount earned by the 
Source: Cowen & Tabarrok,  2015,  
Source: Moffitt (2002) 
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individual we will witness a reduction in the numbers of hours worked. In the case of arrow 3 
this is the sole result of an income effect. In the other two cases the income and the 
substitution effect run in the same direction resulting in a decrease of labor supply that still 
brings a higer income than before. Finally let us see the dynamics that a change in 𝑡 produce 
with the help of Fig.5.  
Figure 5 - Effects of reducing t 
 
In this example we see a marginal tax rate equal to 1. If we reduce this rate we observe what 
we should expect based on the previous section analysis. Those who were in the region 𝐶𝐷 
will now increase their labor supply given that the the reduction on the extra earnings they 
obtain through paid work are not fully retained anymore. This is the reasoning behind other 
alternatives proposed to replace Minimum Income schemes or other welfare policies such as 
the Negative Income Tax or the Earned Income Tax Credit
10
. However, those who were just 
slightly above this region will tend reduce their work effort. For those who were comfortably 
above the mentioned level a reduction in the number of hours worked will be translated into a 
descrease in earnings. For the former we are in the presence of an income effect working 
solely. For the latter we are once again having a substitution and an income effect running 
together in the same direction. 
Let us now center our attention at the effects observed for those with an income that falls in or 
close to the line 𝐴𝐷. As we saw one should expect a negative substitution effect as a result of 
                                                          
10
 The Negative Income Tax was already explained in detail.The Earned Income Tax Credit as the name suggests 
is a tax credit. This credit is a share of the worker’s earned income. The share grows as the individual’s  income 
rises until a certain point where it stagnates and then starts to phase out. The credit rate and the maximum value 
is calculated based on the individual’s  family composition (Scholz, 1996). 
Source: Moffitt (2002) 
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increasing 𝐺 or decreasing 𝑡. This is true for both working and non-working beneficiaries. 
The income effect runs in the case of increasing 𝐺, in the same direction of the substitution 
effect. On the other hand for a decrease in 𝑡 we observe that those who were at point 𝐶 end up 
increasing the number of hours worked or at least not reduce them since there is no incentive 
in doing it. When introducing a BI in a welfare system that currently offers a Minimum 
Income with the usual marginal rate of 100% this is exactly what one should expect even 
though the marginal rate in this case will be 𝑡 = 0 and not 0 < 𝑡 < 1. Table 1 summarizes the 
potential income and substitution effects that could arise depending on the beneficiaries’ 
situation and income. 
Table 1 - Income and Substitution Effects 
 
Earned Income 
Occupation Above G Below G 
Employed 
Income Effect Substitution Effect Income Effect Substitution Effect 
+ None + - 
Total effect Total effect 
Labor supply Reduction Indeterminate 
Unemployed Non applicable 







Labor Market effects are hard to measure. Several variables need to be taken into account and 
models often contain unreasonable assumptions. Nevertheless this chapter had the goal to 
explain the main topics that are at the center of attention when debating the impact of BI on 
Labor Market. The size of the benefit as well as the individual’s preferences need to be taken 








3. Basic Income Experiments 
This chapter will be dedicated to visit four Basic Income Experiments that were conducted 
over the last half century: the US NIT experiments in the 60’s/70’s; the Alaska Permanent 
Fund; the Mhadya Pradesh experiment in India; the Namibia BIG experiment. 
As stated in the introduction, the lack of BI examples leads us to widen the choice in terms of 
the programme characteristics. Apart from Alaska, the US experiments were based on a 
Negative Income Tax and the trials in Africa and India deal with a completely different 
background from the one we have in Portugal. However I believe that each example provides 
valuable data to our work and that each programme will offer comparable figures that will 
allow for several suggestions to the Portuguese case. Furthermore I decided to present 2 
experiments from both developed and under developed countries so that not only potential 
comparisons can be made to the Portuguese case but also to understand how different are the 
results for the two types of realities. 
To be coherent with my work I shall analyze these experiments not case by case but by 
looking at their results jointly at the areas under analysis in this work: Poverty and Labor 
market. 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
Before starting examining the results of the selected experiments let me briefly characterize 
them in time, space and design. 
US experiments: 
The US experiments were conducted in 4 different regions of the United States over the 60’s 
and 70’s. They were based on the idea of a Negative Income Tax (NIT) first proposed and 
developed by Milton Friedman
11
. A NIT is relatively different from a BI in the sense that it is 
not unconditional or universal. However analyzing these particular trials can be important for 
this work for the results they can deliver on fundamental matters such as labor supply 
response. The amount of the benefit varied from 50% to 150% of the poverty line threshold 
amount. A full summary of the experiment conditions can be seen with Table 2. All of the 
trials contained both an experimental group and a control group. 
                                                          
11
 To see more on this check chapter 2.1 
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Madhya Pradesh, India 
In the region of Madhya Pradesh 6000 people from 9 different villages were granted with an 
average payment of $USD 24 per month. The amount was the equivalent to a quarter of the 
income of the median-income family, which was roughly equivalent to the poverty line. The 
transfer occurred for a period from 12 to 17 months between June 2011 and November 2012. 
It was developed in a partnership between UNICEF and a local women’s association named 
the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA). 12 other villages were treated as a control 
group. 
Alaska Permanent Fund: 
The Alaska Permanent Fund was established in 1976 based on oil revenues. The fund pays a 
yearly dividend to every citizen based on a 5 year average performance. This dividend comes 
really close to our definition of UBI in the sense that it is no means-tested, universal and 
individual. It is the only BI experiment that was not time lined. The dividend amounts on 
average to US$2000, a sum that represents roughly 6% of the average personal income. 
 
 






The BI trial in Namibia was conducted from January 2008 to December 2009, with all 
Otjivero-Omitara (area in Namibia) residents, who were under 60, being given N$100 per 
month, an amount only N$18 below the average per capita income of N$118. This experiment 
was developed by the Namibian BIG (Basic Income Grant) Coalition, a group formed by 
several Namibian NGO’s. 
 
3.2 –Poverty  
As we saw earlier in this work, current poverty rates on both developed and under-developed 
countries are one of the main arguments of BI claimers. From the four experiments we are 
here analyzing, only the ones that were conducted in Namibia and India had amongst their 
primary goals to fight poverty. Nevertheless in all of the trials here presented, we can draw 
conclusions on the subject either by a direct analysis on poverty indicators or by examining 
the behavior of other variables that can relate to the topic.  
In Namibia almost the entire population was poor
12
. Before the project started 97% of people 
were severely poor and 72% were below the food poverty line (Graph 1) .The first immediate 
consequence was a drop in those numbers. Just after a year, those with food deprivation were 
now 16% and those facing severe poverty were 43%
13
. This was accompanied by reductions 
on child malnutrition – 42% to 10% - (Making the Difference – The BIG in Namibia, 2009, 
p.53). Moreover income rose. Not only income provided by BIG, but that from wages and 
self-employment (Graph 2). The latter expanded from N$118 to N$154, a 30% increase. As 
for Self-employment there was an increase in income from this source of 301% (Table 3).  All 
of these results can be seen below. 
     
                 
     
                                                          
12
 The poverty line in Namibia was at the time set at N$316 per month. The Namibian GDP per capita at PPP 
was $7850 in 2008, roughly 1/7 of the US GDP per capita at PPP.  
13
 These numbers were controlled for migration, given that several people moved to the area, even though they 
would not receive the benefit 
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                Graph 1 - BIG Namibia Poverty Indicators                                Graph 2- BIG Namibia - Income 
 
                            
                                                    




The reports from Madhya Pradesh do not examine the usual poverty indicators. Hence we will 
analyze other important poverty measures and compare them between experiment and control 
groups bearing in mind that the benefit was roughly a quarter of the income generated by a 
median-income family. A first indicator is children’s weight. As we can see through Table 4 
and Table 5 at the beginning of the trial, BI villages had 60.8% of children underweight 
against 52.1% in control villages. At the end the number with the BI population dropped to 
41.1% and decreased to 41.8% amongst the control children.  
Source: Making the Difference – The 
BIG in Namibia (2009) 
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                   Table 4 - Mhadya Pradesh -  Treatment Group                 Table 5 - Mhadya Pradesh - Control Group 




Let us now look at how earned income changed for both groups. 21% of those receiving BI 
claimed they increased their earned income against 10% who say their income decreased 
(Graph 3). On the other hand for the control group, 19% saw their earned income decreasing 
and only 9% enjoyed a rise in their revenue.  
 
 




In the North-American experiments the background and focus was different. Given this let us 
look at some of the indicators on this topic. In Alaska the dividend did reduce poverty, but 
Source: Piloting Basic Income Transfers in 
Mhadya Pradesh, India(2014) 
Source: Piloting Basic Income Transfers in 
Mhadya Pradesh, India(2014)                       
Note: There is here a distinction from SEWA 
and Non-SEWA depending if the association 
was active in that village 
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after an initial drop in the first years – In 1979 the poverty rate in Alaska was 10.8%
14
 
(Danzinger&Ross, 1987) - rates have been increasing over the last 25 years. Graph 4 shows 
that poverty rates decrease by an average of 2% due to the dividend but those rates have rose 
in all Alaskan areas. The problem is more complex in the rural areas, where most native 
Alaskans live and where jobs are scarce and the economy is highly based on agriculture. It 
needs to be taken into account that Alaska is not the only state where poverty has risen. Right 
before the dividend started being distributed the US average poverty rate was 11.6%, a 
number very close to the Alaskan one. Today the US rate is 14.8% against a share of 11.4% 
of Alaskans being poor. Furthermore in 1979 Alaska was the 26
th
 state with the lowest 
poverty rate and today it is the 8
th
 state dealing with the smallest incidence of poverty (US 
Census Bureau, 2017).   
 
Graph 4 - Alaska Poverty Rates 
 
 
Regarding the NIT experiments, results on poverty are harder to infer from and need special 
caution on examining them. There is no direct data evaluating the evolution of poverty rates 
in the areas covered by the benefit. Nevertheless the final reports on these experiments when 
existent, do evaluate the changes that such a programme could produce taking into account 
the potential dissolution of other State assistance schemes. Poverty rates vary according to the 
type of help provided and the family under assistance as Table 6 shows. For example, single 
female headed families would always be worse off. This has to be seen in context. These tests 
were conducted about 40 years ago and the labor market composition was significantly 
                                                          
14
 In the United States the poverty line is defined by the US Census Bureau at a threshold that corresponds to 
three times the cost of a minimum food diet. 
Source: Berman & Reamey (2016) 
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different from now with female participation rates exploding ever since. In 1970 female 
participation rate was 43.3% and in 2014 it was 57%
15
. With female participation in the labor 
market still low, dependence on State help was high for this type of family. On the other hand 
results for more traditional families at the time - husband-wife families – were expected to be 
virtuous. Poverty rates would decrease in one of the benefit types and the poverty gap would 
substantially diminish in both of the scheme forms.  
 
Table 6 - NIT – Predicted Poverty Effects for all Experiments  
 
 
Results on poverty are shown to be fairly positive. For under-developed regions we see that 
people whose situation involved being deprived from the most essential resources, used the 
benefit to access those resources rather than exhausting the money in a less “ethical” way. 
Moreover and perhaps more important we see that beneficiaires used the contribution in such 
a productive way, that they were able to increase their own earned income. This shows that a 
BI has the potential not only to temporarily reduce poverty through the income boost provided 
but eliminate it due to the incentive of consuming the benefit in a productive way. In the 
United States results were slightly different.  The dividend does indeed reduce poverty rates 
in Alaska in a still considerable way. As for the NIT experiments results were less exciting. 
Nevertheless we need to take into account the timing of the experience as well as its 
characteristics in terms of people covered and conditions offered.  
 
                                                          
15
 Source:Status of Women in the States, viewed 9 February 2017, <https://statusofwomendata.org/earnings-and-
the-gender-wage-gap/womens-labor-force-participation/> 
  Source: Source:  Final Report of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment – 
Volume – 1 (1983) 
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3.3 – Labor Market 
To discuss the sustainability of a BI one needs to discuss its impact on the Labor Market. 
Defenders claim it is a way to provide fair and decent access to the most neglected ones, 
opponents fear that such a measure could create harmful new dynamics by eliminating the 
incentive to work and reducing labor supply. The experiments under analysis here provide 
important data on several aspects of the Labor Market. The NIT experiments were mainly 
developed to test the response of low-income families in respect to labor participation. Hence 
extended data is available to evaluate how these bottom decile households behave in the 
presence of such an incentive. The schemes developed in the underdeveloped regions had the 
aim of alleviating severe cases of starvation but also provide valuable information on how 
those who are more in need react in terms of consumption, labor supply responses and 
education. Thus several conclusions can be taken regarding the subject of labor market in 
those experiments. 
In India, as we can see with Table 7 the number of hours worked in both the primary and the 
secondary activity
16
 met no alteration. Results are similar for control and treatment 
populations. The number of days spent at work per month saw a small change with a bigger 
focus on the main activity and a little decrease in the secondary activity.  
 




                                                          
16
 The report on Madhya Pradesh defines two types of activities based on the time spent: the main one which is 
the one that the household devotes more time to, usually paid work for others; a secondary activity that takes less 
time and that can include paid and unpaid work such as housing activities or farming. 
Source: Piloting Basic Income Transfers in 
Mhadya Pradesh, India(2014) 
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Looking now more deeply at what those main activities are. Graph 5 shows that the biggest 
shift that occurred in both groups was in the share of those working on own account. This 
happened mainly due to a reduction in terms of casual work for wages in the case of the 
experimental group and the decrease in the share of people in the control group who worked 
for wages as regular employment. Finally we shall see how did the labor market evolved in 
more generic terms regarding the household status before and after the benefit with the help 
of Graph 6. Although somewhat small, differences between groups confirm what one should 
expect. For those receiving the benefit, there was an increase in the group of people working 
for pay, which leads me to believe that they took advantage of the situation and created an 
opportunity to increase their gains. This led to more people in this group that were not 
employed due to housework or family care, possibly making use of the extra profit. Finally 
two important numbers arise from this figure. First, the share of people who were not working 
because they were attending some training or education decreased. Second, those unemployed 
and seeking for work were now less, which can mean that this benefit lead to a disincentive to 
pursue a work activity. 
 




Source: Piloting Basic Income Transfers in 
Mhadya Pradesh, India(2014) 
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Graph 6 - Mhadya Pradesh- Employment 
   
 
 
Data in Namibia regarding this topic is less extensive. However there are still two interest 
indicators to analyze. Graph 7 shows the evolution of unemployment rates in the region 
during the programme. We see that unemployment rate dropped from 60% to 45%, with 
employment rising from 44% to 55%. Although no concrete data exists on whether the benefit 
brought a reduction in the number of hours worked, ultimately we know that the incentive got 
more people into the labor market. Given that as we saw earlier the personal income 
excluding the benefit increased it is fair to assume that even if the number of hours worked 
did indeed decrease, productivity gains were observed. Thus no real disincentive was created 
with the scheme. What the report on this experiment can also tell us is how the source of 
household income changed with the programme. As we saw before with Table 3 there was a 
blast in terms of revenue from self-employment. Moreover we see that although in a shyer 
way, all items enjoyed an increase with the exception of remittances, clearly a sign that less 
support was needed from family members of other regions
17
. This increase in self-
employment, as reports state, was due to the small enterprises that emerged in areas like 
clothing manufacturing or retailing. Their appearance was only possible as a result of the 
demand boost and start-up capital that was provided by a Basic Income. 
                                                          
17
 It is worth mentioning that inflation was around 9%, meaning that even taking inflation into account there was 
a clear boost in the economy due to the benefit 
Source: Piloting Basic Income Transfers in 
Mhadya Pradesh, India(2014) 
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In Alaska the labor supply response to the dividend was almost insignificant. When asked if 
there was a reduction in the amount of time spent working for pay, only 1% of the people 
answered affirmatively (Erickson et al., 1984). Obvious caution is needed when examining 
these numbers given that people might have worked less for other reason than the dividend or 
they might not want to admit a decrease in labor
18
. However it is fair to assume that even if 
we are facing a number above 1%, a small number should still be expected. Nevertheless we 
have to look at the size of the dividend and its relevance on the household income. In the 
years reported the dividend was a $USD 1000 in 1982 and $USD 386 in 1983 (ibid). At the 
time the dividend represented in one case around 7% and in the other 2% of the total personal 
income (Berman & Reamey, 2016). Although 7% is already a significant value, when we look 
at what BI proponents suggest as a fair amount to be distributed, no definite conclusions can 
be taken from these numbers. Furthermore in the Alaskan case there is no data reporting how 
lower-income families (those whose benefit represents a higher share of income) respond 
differently in terms of labor from wealthier households. 
Despite being based on a different concept NIT experiments are able to shed some light on the 
behavior of lower income families in response to cash incentives. A first generic look can be 
taken at the average response of the 4 NIT experiments (Table 8, 9 and 10). Apart from 
husbands, all groups show a significant decrease in labor supply due to the incentive. 
                                                          
18
 This type of behaviour is known as social desirability bias. People will tend to respond in a way that will be 
seen as favorable by other. To see more: Foulsham & Kaminska (2013) 
Source: Making the Difference – The 
BIG in Namibia (2009) 
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Moreover employment rates in these groups also present large reductions, meaning that 
people tend not only to work less but some even leave the labor market. 
    
             Table 8 - NIT- Husbands Labor Response                                             Table 9 - NIT- Wives Labor Response 
                         
Table 10 - NIT- Single Female Heads Labor Response 
 
   
 
These first numbers are noteworthy but given the heterogeneity of conditions in the 4 
experiments let us have a deeper look on each of them individually. By looking at Table 2  we 
see that the New Jersey and the rural experiment were those whose criteria for eligibility were 
more tight (maximum income of 1.5 times the poverty line for a family of four). On the 
contrary, Gary and Seattle-Denver were more generous on this criteria allowing for 
households with income as high as 2.4 and 3.5 times the poverty line of four respectively to 




participate. Moreover the Seattle-Denver experiment was also the most generous in terms of 
the amount distributed with the lowest guarantee being 95% of the poverty level, a number 
close to the highest amounts delivered in the other regions. Results tend to confirm theory. 
Seattle-Denver shows for all of the groups the highest reduction in hours worked and 
employment rates. The NIT experiments also tell us how different households tend to have 
different responses. Both wives and single female heads show significant reductions in labor 
supply and employment enrollment, with numbers as high as 16% for the latter. As we did for 
poverty we need to address this having the status quo at the time for women and career in 
mind. This can help explain the difference in the response of man and woman. This 
assumption is corroborated by the numbers in the rural area, where reductions are 
substantially higher, as one should expect from more conservative regions as rural Iowa or 
rural North Carolina where tradition would label men as the money makers and women as 
housewives.  After analyzing more thoroughly the labour supply response in terms of hours 
worked, let us see in more detail how NIT affects employment based on an estimated model. 
Table 11 summarizes the results.  




Percentage of people entering employment decreases more than 30% on all categories. The 
same happens with the share of households who get unemployed, a number never below 
7.9%. However when we look on a one year horizon results are slightly different. The number 
of entries into employment is still negatively affected - although the size of the impact is 
smaller- but the number of entries into non-employment is actually reduced by NIT for 
women. Context can once again help to explain this. Given the low female participation rate 
  Source: Source:  Final Report of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment – 
Volume – 1 (1983) 
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in the labor market and the importance of the man figure as head of the house it is expectable 
that women who are involved in paid work do it not only for the income but for a personal 
preference for a professional career. Hence such a benefit does not provide a disincentive high 
enough to quit their job. Finally the benefit also affects the length of both employment and 
unemployment. The first tends to be reduced by 15% on average and the latter increases by at 
least 42.3%. 
The above analysis is important in two ways: first it tell us how real experiments show 
somewhat more sucessful results than those predicted by theoretical models. Second they 
allows us to make the bridge to the portuguese reality and understand what can and cannot be 
compared. We have seen that in the under-developed regions the incentive brought motivating 
results in terms of economic conditions. People were able to avoid deep scarceness and 
transform the incentive into something that allows them to become self-sustainable. Moreover 
labor supply responses tend to show no disincentive in terms of hours at work or participation 
in the labor market. Although we witness cases of severe deprivation in Portugal, the 
country’s reality is still very different. In Namibia and India we are dealing with a very 
primitive economy based mostly on the primary and secondary sectors. The challenges that 
people receiving the benefit in these regions face are somehow different and perhaps less 
demanding than those faced by potential beneficiaries in Portugal, specially in terms of 
inclusion. One would expect that in an economy that is eager for qualified workforce and 
where tecnhology and expertise are driving forces it is harder for people to become valuable 
for society. Nevertheless the type of temptations and potential disincentives that such a 
stimulus can bring to the population covered are fairly similar and one should not disregard 
the evidence brought by these experiments on these issues. As for developed regions,  
conclusions are a little different. In Alaska we saw that the dividend is indeed capable of 
recuding the incidence of poverty. However and mainly due to the small amount distributed, 
the measure has not been capable to avoid poverty rates to grow over the last decades, 
following the trend in the entire country. NIT experiments confirm what is perhaps the 
biggest concern regarding BI –labor supply response. This response seems to be highly 
sensitive to the generosity of the programme. We saw that the most generous schemes 
presented the most upsetting results regarding labor supply reduction. The results are also 
displeasing in terms of employment with reductions both in the probability of being employed 
and the time spent on a job and an increase in the chances of being unemployed and the time 
spent without a job. Since we will be dealing with people whose economic and social 
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situation is very related to those treated by the NIT, the analysis of both current and potential 
benefit’s size and generosity and its repercussions are of the essence in this work. 
With these results in mind I will now move on to the next stage where I shall compare them 





























4. Minimum Income Scheme vs Basic Income – A Portuguese Case 
What I intend to do over this chapter is to look at the current state of the Portuguese Minimum 
Income Scheme and compare it with what we learnt so far about BI. As I stated earlier the 
focus of the analysis shall be on the Portuguese economy. Hence, when appropriate, several 
indicators will be examined in order to give useful context. In order to have a deeper grasp of 
the Portuguese scheme I am going to start with a small introduction explaining the main goals 
of the policy as well as its characteristics and origins. After this I will provide the usual 
analysis by topic starting with a look on poverty and then moving on to the subject of labor 
market. 
 
4.1 Introduction –  
The Portuguese GMI is a non-contributory benefit paid by the Social Security System. It was 
first introduced in 1996 under the name of Rendimento Minimo Garantido with the aim of 
ensuring households at risk the resources to satisfy basic needs and social and professional 
inclusion. The benefit is delivered according to the gap between the household income and a 
certain threshold defined by the state and is intended to close this gap. Changing the name to 
Rendimento Social de Inserção (RSI) in 2003 – in line with the new focus of these type of 
schemes regarding inclusion - the programme’s objective is not only to provide a minimum 
level of dignity to its beneficiaries but also to promote social integration through a job, 
vocational training or community service.  
To better understand the size of the programme and its evolution we can look at Graph 8 and 
Graph 9. The graphs show us that each beneficiary receives around 110€, an amount that has 
been increasing over the last decade. On the other hand the number of beneficiaries has been 
dropping and is currently around 300.000. The total amount spent on this programme has also 
been decreasing since its implementation with a little turn over the last two years. RSI 









Graph 9 - RSI as % of Social Security Expenditure 
   
    
 
According to Statistics Portugal (INE), in 2015 the annual value that defined the poverty line 
in Portugal was 5268€. This corresponds to an average monthly value of 439€. Given that on 
average each beneficiary obtains 110€, this corresponds to about 20% of the poverty line 
income. Moreover the median net income in Portugal in 2015 was 8780€ (INE). Thus a 
benefit of 110€ represents around 12% of this average net income. These percentages are in 

























  Source: Social Security Portugal(2017) 
Source: Rendimento Minimo em Portugal – Retratos de 20 anos a desafiar práticas e 




benefit is universal. However when we compare to the amounts distributed in the other three 
experiments we see that the Portuguese scheme’s amount falls way below. The population 
targeted is more or less similar - those who are in the bottom deciles - with the obvious 
differences that exist between a nation as Portugal and the underdeveloped regions of Otjivero 
and Madhya Pradesh. This target is confirmed by the data. According to INE, the percentage 
of people at risk of poverty after social transfers is 19%
19
. This means roughly 2M citizens. 
With the programme targeting only 300.000 it is clear that the policy does indeed target those 
who are in the most severe situations leaving behind a large share of poor people. Lastly and 
given the relevance of the labor market topic for this work I believe that as an introductory 
note it is relevant to see how the RSI population compares with the country’s population in 
terms of work situation. Table 12 compares nationwide indicators with an RSI sample. The 
key figure is the difference in the share of unemployed people. With 60% of beneficiaries 
being unemployed, active market labor policies have to be taken into account when discussing 
the importance of a Minimum Income scheme. This discussion should take into consideration 
the results earlier found for the BI experiments namely how those in the bottom deciles 
behave in the presence of this kind of incentive 
 









After this short description, it is now interesting to look at the performance of the system in 
the context of the Portuguese economy and compare it to the results that were found on the 
Basic Income trials here examined. Several papers and reports have looked on the subject of 
RSI and its impact and I should refer to them on assessing the scheme. For this analysis I will 
look at the usual two main topics: Poverty and Labor Market.  
                                                          
19
 The at-risk-of-poverty rate here described corresponds to an annual net income below €5,268 in 2015 (INE)  
 
Portugal RSI sample 
Active 60,2 75,3 
Employed  49,6 14,6 
Unemployed 10,6 60,7 
Inactive 39,8 24,7 
Source:  Impactos dos Acordos de Inserçãono Desempenho do RSI(entre 2006-2009) - 




4.2 Poverty – 
The Portuguese Social Security describes RSI as a measure that is mainly intended to 
intervene in the most severe cases of poverty by protecting and supporting those who are 
facing a situation of deep scarceness
20
. Over the next lines we should see how successful has 
the measure been on achieving this and how different could a BI behave given the current 
Portuguese situation in this subject. 
Existing data on this topic covers two periods, before and after a scheme reform in 2010. This 
reform changed the means-tested conditions, reducing substantially the number of 
beneficiaries. For this reason I shall do a comparative analysis rather than a single one. This 
will allow us to not only evaluate the scheme performance on alleviating poverty but also 
understand how the reform impacted the numbers. Table 13 shows us that RSI is being 
successful in lightening the severity and intensity of poverty with interesting numbers for both 











The country’s indicators on this topic are upsetting. Graph 10 shows the evolution of at-
poverty-risk rates since 2004 in Portugal. We can see that we still face high rates and that 
those rates are not improving. These numbers are quite similar to those we saw for Alaska. 
The dividend in Alaska is not being able to stop the rise in the state’s poverty rates over the 
last years. The same is true for RSI in Portugal. The amount of the two transfers is also very 
equivalent. This means that even a universal income if not high enough cannot by itself tackle 
poverty. However the Alaskan benefit seems to achieve better results than the Portuguese one. 
In Alaska over the last decades the poverty rate never decreased on average by less than 2%. 
                                                          
20
 Source: <http://www.seg-social.pt/rendimento-social-de-insercao> viewed at 3 March 2017 
  Source:  Farinha Rodrigues (2012) 
 Table 13 - RSI Effects on Poverty 
Note: After RSI(1) – Before the Reform; 
After RSI (2) – After the Reform 
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In Portugal even before the reform of the policy, RSI was only able to achieve a reduction of 
0.3%. 
Graph 10 - Poverty Evolution in Portugal 
 
 
The country performs much better regarding the impact on the intensity of poverty. RSI 
seems able to reduce both intensity and severity by a number close to 1% in absolute value. 
Farinha Rodrigues (2012) calculates that 2.5% of the population is severely poor. This means 
roughly 250.000 people. Although the characteristics that define this type of severe poverty 
are different from those we observe in the under-developed regions
21
 analyzed in this work it 
is true that BI seems more effective in tackling them. In Namibia the number of people who 
were under the food poverty line dropped by 56% in absolute value. The best indicator 
available in Madhya Pradesh, number of children underweight, also enjoyed an interesting 
reduction of 19.5% in absolute value. Backgrounds are different and so are the conditions. 
The BI experiments were conducted with relatively small samples and had the clear aim of 
alleviating scarcity of those receiving the benefit. RSI is only one instrument in the 
Portuguese set of tools available to act on reducing poverty. Nevertheless the scale of 
reduction in terms of poverty severity is so high in the regions here observed that I believe 
that it is worth looking carefully at how beneficial a BI could be in improving these numbers 
in Portugal. 
Looking now at efficiency, Table 14 shows us several measures that can help us with this 
analysis. The 2010 Reform had no significant impact on both the Vertical Efficiency of the 
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 The European Comission defines severe poverty as not being able to purchase at least four of the nine 
following items: to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills; to keep their home adequately warm; to face 
unexpected expenses; to eat meat or proteins regularly; to go on holiday; a television set; a washing machine; a 
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  Source:  OECD (2017) 
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Programme (VEP) and the Poverty Reduction Efficiency (PRE). The two indicators show 
really high numbers for both periods with minor improvements reflecting the tightening of 
rules. This means two things. First, it confirms that RSI is a measure only available to those in 
need. Such a high value of VEP means that nearly no beneficiary received the transfer without 
being poor. Second, the numbers for PRE show that the transfer although small is almost 
entirely devoted to reducing poverty. On the other hand the Poverty Gap Efficiency (PGE) 
presents less thrilling numbers. This measure which is an indicator of horizontal efficiency 
had a value of 27.3%, a number that dropped by half after the 2010 reform. Hence, by now 
RSI reduces the proportion of the aggregate poverty gap by only 15.4%. In the NIT 
experiments an estimate was made on the average poverty gap change by type of household. 
When we looked to families as a whole, the poverty gap reduction was over 24% for both of 
the scheme’s designs. The only situation where the individual would on average be worse off 
was for the case of single-female headed families. We saw before how these results could 
partially be explained by the status quo existent at the time in terms of participation of 
females in the labor market. Thus there is no reason to believe that better results would not be 
achieved. 
Table 14 - RSI Efficiency Indicators 
 
 
Another important issue debated while analyzing the impact of BI on poverty was its ability 
to increase the income that beneficiaries generate by its own efforts. For both Madhya 
Pradesh and Otjivero, the regions with available data on this, there was on average an increase 
on the income self-generated. To see how RSI behaves on this variable let us analyze the 
share of contracts that were terminated due to a change in income. Table 15 demonstrates that 
half of contracts terminated are so due to a change in the beneficiaries’ income. This should 
be seen as good news. However when we look at the same table we see that not even 1% are 
terminated due to integration in the labor market. This means that that income change is 
mostly conducted by other sources of income such as other social benefits or revenue 
generated by potentially unproductive activities  that do not contribute effectively to promote 
  Source:  Farinha Rodrigues (2012) 
39 
 
integration in society. Thus we see that RSI is not able to improve one’s ability to become 
more productive and hence self-sustainable.   
 
 




When I first cross-examined what literature exhausts as the main differences between the 
effects of BI and Minimum Income on poverty we saw that the main point was the breakdown 
of the poverty trap provided by the introduction of BI. Minimum Income had the ability of 
avoiding beneficiaries from falling below a certain threshold that the state defines as a 
minimum for a decent living. However and mostly due to a marginal tax rate of 100% the 
measure was only half effective since it trapped the population covered in a cycle of 
“reasonable”poverty. The results we saw for Portugal confirm exactly this point. The scheme 
is successful in preventing the most severe types of poverty but it does not really affect its 
general incidence. Moreover it does not seem able to provide the necessary tools to avoid 
beneficiaries from becoming welfare dependent. BI on its turn showed more exciting results 
in fighting both poverty incidence and severity. For the case of under-developed regions it 
undeniably reduced scarceness and provided the means to prevent people from becoming 
trapped to the benefit. The boost in self-earned income is a sign of this. For the US 
experiments, although unable to stop poverty growth, BI was able to reduce much more 
effectively the incidence of it in Alaska, a region whose reality is fairly similar to Portugal.   
 




4.3 Labor Market –  
One of the RSI fundamentals is to promote an active inclusion of its beneficiaries in society. 
Active labor market policies are essential to achieve this. Thus, to evaluate the effectiveness 
and potential of the scheme it is vital to understand how successful it has been on promoting 
this inclusion. Over this chapter we will look at some of the indicators that describe the 
impact of RSI in the labor market. Furthermore and similarly to what I did in the previous 
chapter I will compare those effects to those observed in the BI experiments.  
Let me start this analysis by comparing how different is the labor supply response produced 
by the two schemes. The data available on RSI does not report the changes in terms of hours 
or days worked. However I believe some interpretation can be made through several other 
indicators.  As we saw earlier the unemployment rate amongst those who are under RSI is 
much higher than the national average (60.7% vs 10.6%). This shows how important it is to 
effectively promote inclusion with the scheme. Yet the number of people whose contracts 
were ceased due to finding a job is almost insignificant (Table 14). The number was never 
above 300 people, which represents a share of 1% or less from all the contracts terminated. 
Unable to act on those who are unemployed let us now see how does it affect those who are 
working. Tables 16 and 17 show that from the initial small share of people who were working 
– 8.1% of those interviewed and 26.5% of their spouses – around 40% became unemployed. 
In the case of the interviewees, only 39.4% of people kept working, a number that is lower 
than the one we find for spouses, 57.5%. 
 
Table 16 - % of RSI Beneficiaries working - When claimed vs Now 
Interviewee Spouse 
Then Now Then  Now 








Source:  Impactos dos Acordos de Inserçãono Desempenho do RSI(entre 2006-2009) - 
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In order to better comprehend these numbers let us look at Tables 18 and 19. A staggering 
94% of the people in this sample reported not receiving any job offer in the last year. This 
number happens even though only around 11% of people claimed to never have looked for a 
job. I already mentioned the danger of social desirability bias but even if these numbers are 
not exactly correct, they are so strong that some truth must lie behind them.  
 
Table 18 - RSI - Did you have any job offer in the last year?     Table 19  - RSI - Last time you looked for a job? 
 
 










Did you have any job offer in the 
last year? 
1. Yes, one,                                       
that I did not accept 
4,2% 
2. Yes, more than 
one, that I did not 
accept 
1,5% 
3. No, I had no offer 93,8% 




When was the last time you looked 
for a job? 
1.In the last 3 
months 
47,1% 





Source:  Impactos dos Acordos de Inserçãono Desempenho do RSI(entre 2006-2009) - 




Source:  Impactos dos Acordos de Inserçãono Desempenho do RSI(entre 2006-2009) - 






When I looked at what literature had to say about the labor market effects of the two policies 
under analysis in this work I understood that the focus was on the labor supply effects as well 
as the ability to prevent unemployment and encourage the inclusion in the labor market.  
The under-developed regions of Mhadya Pradesh and Otjivero presented generally positive 
results. In the Namibian case reports stated a decline in unemployment and an increase in the 
income generated by individuals through self-employment, farming or working for others. 
Similar to RSI no direct impact on the number of hours worked was measured. In the African 
country results seem to be the opposite of those for RSI indicating a rise in employment and a 
productivity boost. It is interesting to note that despite having contexts that are poles apart, the 
initial unemployment rate of those under BI and the unemployment rate amongst the 
beneficiaries of RSI is similar (60%). In India, BI also produced results way above those 
attained with RSI.  Employment rose for the villages under treatment with an increase in the 
share of people working on their own-account for income. The segment of people 
unemployed and looking for a job decreased while the number of people not working due to 
housework grew. However less people were now not working because they were pursuing 
some form of education or training. India also presented results on the issue of hours and days 
worked with no significant impact being identified. When we compare these results to those 
obtained with RSI, the success of BI is hard to question. Under-qualified people dealing with 
challenging forms of poverty were able due to the incentive to increase their wealth and 
become more involved in society. On the contrary RSI seems unable to deliver similar results 
to people who are also under-qualified regarding the country’s reality and that are the faces of 
the country’s most severe cases of poverty.  
Results obtained in the experiments conducted in the US – Alaska and the NIT trials, are 
somewhat different. In the case of Alaska the only data available was a survey response 
regarding the impact of the dividend in the number of hours and days worked. The percentage 
of Alaskans reporting a decrease in time spent working was small (1%). I already identified 
the potential cause for this small impact. Representing on average 6% of the medium Alaskan 
household income, the amount is not big enough to really result as a disincentive to work. In 
the case of the NIT experiments reality is different. Covering households with income as high 
as 3.5 times the poverty line in the country resulted in different outcomes in terms of 
employment and number of hours worked. The generosity of these programmes came in two 
forms: the amount distributed and the maximum income allowed in order to be part of the 
programme. What results have showed is that the first seems more important than the second. 
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Seattle-Denver, the place where the effects on labor supply were stronger was the most 
generous in the two conditions mentioned above. However in Indiana, where the level of 
income accepted was high but the guarantee level was in line with the other programmes –
apart from Seattle-Denver- showed results that are similar to those achieved by New Jersey 
and the rural areas. As we know RSI is both strict in terms of income level allowed to enroll 
and the value distributed, with amounts that are way below those granted even in the less 
benevolent NIT experiments here analyzed. Based on the above it seems like the broken link 
we have identified between RSI beneficiaries and the labor market has nothing to do with a 
too generous scheme or the disincentives produced with the transfer – a common belief 
amongst the population (Martinez & Silva, 2013). The impact on employment produced by 
NIT was as we saw not measured but rather estimated. However the results are similar. The 
scheme seems to increase the probability of being unemployed and enlarge the time spent 
without a job. In the case of RSI although a significant percentage of people who were 
working when they claimed the benefit became unemployed at some point, the overall 
percentage of those having a job tends to be stable. Thus despite not promoting employment, 
RSI does not seem to encourage idleness either. However it seems to create dependence. 
Almost 80% of people claim that they cannot imagine their life without RSI. This can be 
interpreted in two ways. We can look at this number as a symptom that beneficiaries are not 
willing to make an effort to change their situation and seem to be accommodated. The other 
way of looking at this number it that RSI rather than contributing in some way to social 
mobility or acting as a promoter for inclusion, it provides instead some sort of mobility trap 
where those under the scheme struggle toescape from. As a matter of fact from those 80% 
who do not see themselves living without RSI more than half of them (55.6%) still claim 
“finding a job” as the best thing that could happen. A share that is slightly higher than those 
who would prefer an increase on the benefit, 47.2%. However from the share of people who 
believe they will be able to exit the scheme either in less or more than one year, most mention 








This work was developed with two purposes: first to identify the current state of the 
Minimum Income Scheme Policy as a method to tackle poverty and promote inclusion with a 
focus on the Portuguese case; and second to analyze and compare the potential andvantages 
and disadvantages of implementing a Basic Income scheme over the mentioned parameters in 
the nation’s context. This is not an easy task due to the low number of BI experiments that 
were conducted. In addition the information that  we can obtain to evaluate them is restricted 
by data being very limited. Both limitations imply that the ability to extract lessons that could 
be used for comparisons between schemes or across different sociological and economic 
realities is sometimes limited. Nevertheless, the current low results of Minimum Income and 
the growing attention that public authories are giving to BI led me to believe that a work of 
this nature would be relevant. A Minimum Income Scheme is aimed at alleviating poverty 
while contributting to succesfully promote inclusion amongst its beneficiaries. Nonetheless in 
Portugal the policy only does half of the job. Poverty intensity is indeed reduced, but 
individuals seemed trapped in a cycle of poverty where finding a decent job or any job at all is 
a rare occasion. Moreover what results show is that rather than being a problem of supply 
only, there seems to be a mismatch between the market needs and the beneficiaries’s abilities 
and skills. Given the analysis developed in this work I believe that I can argue that Basic 
Income experiments seemed to produce better results on both tackling poverty and promoting 
inclusion. The scheme was able to raise beneficiaries’ income while preventing dependency 
from the policy and promoting inclusion in society as a whole and the labor market in 
particular. Nonetheless in more developed regions it was observed that a more generous 
benefit both in size and in coverage can raise labor response issues. In sum this work raises 
some questions about the ability of the Portuguese Minimum Income Scheme to fullfill the 
goals that were behind its foundation and hence it needs some type of reconfiguration. It also 
believes that past Basic Income Experiments have produced results that are too good to be 
ignored. Finally it suggests that the idea of a Basic Income should be considered as an 
alternative policy to the current measure. All of this does not dismiss the idea that further 
research is needed on the topic, namely through small scale BI experiments and further 
examinations of the schemes currently in place. Only with more extensive data can we 
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